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IN THE 1920s and 1930s, independent groups coming from different national 
identities collaborated in establishing the existence of nuclear particles, deﬁning 
theoretical models of atomic structure, and analyzing in their laboratories effects 
of nuclear reactions.1 Yet, if international cooperation shaped the emergence of 
nuclear physics in the U.S. and Europe, then no less signiﬁcant was the interna-
tional competition between individual research groups working in local contexts. 
The race to make a new discovery not only marked individual contributions but 
also deﬁned new ways of exploiting research ﬁndings linking discoveries with the 
world of business and industry. 
The reasons why international collaboration has been emphasized in the 
emergence of nuclear physics are well known. During the 1940s, the international 
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1. Victor Weisskopf can speak for them all: “In Copenhagen, Cambridge and all the coun-
tries I went through, people from abroad were highly appreciated…there was a typically 
international atmosphere which attracted people like myself very much.” V.F. Weisskopf, 
“Physics and physicists the way I knew them,” in Charles Wiener, ed., History of twentieth 
In 1935 a group of Italian scientists led by Enrico Fermi applied for a US 
patent on a process that looked, at the time, about as impractical as a bridge of 
butterﬂies  ʼwings. While working together in Rome, they had discovered that 
neutrons…could be slowed down by passage through water or parafﬁn. Thus 
slowed, the neutrons were more likely to be captured by other elements, making 
them radioactive. Time magazine, 10 Aug 1953.
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dimension of the wartime Manhattan Project and the convergence of scientists of 
many different nationalities within the same research endeavor helped to preserve, 
and perhaps to project back, with this climate of collaboration.2 On the other hand 
recent historical work has revealed that international rivalry was also extremely 
signiﬁcant in the early days of nuclear physics. Strong competition between na-
tional networks of physicists and industrialists promoting the adoption of different 
atomic models ﬂourished in the thirties.3 The existence of a widespread industrial 
interest in the application of discoveries in nuclear physics has also been recently 
understood in greater detail.4 Thus we now know that the relationships among 
nuclear physicists, businessmen, and industrialists were a part of this international 
dimension of nuclear physics. Trading activities centered on nuclear research were 
also signiﬁcant and they resulted in the promotion of several types of new industrial 
methods and instruments. 
These revisions also add to historical studies focusing on industrial patents in 
physics and its allied sciences. Geoffrey Bowker showed the signiﬁcance of patents 
and patenting as tools of socio-technological change within the context of scientiﬁc 
research in geophysics.5 Peter Galison has indicated the importance of patenting 
in the “trading zones” of physics in connection with looking at Einsteinʼs work 
as a patent ofﬁcer in Bern before 1905. Galison ﬁnds that the material culture of 
relativity was shaped by the analysis of inventions such as new electro-magnetic 
clocks and instruments.6 
This paper draws on these studies and revisions to appraise the historical trajec-
tory of nuclear physics in Italy in the 1930s. Here, I consider the research activities 
century physics. Proceedings of the international school of physics “Enrico Fermi,” Varenna 
1972 (New York, 1977), 437. 
2. Cf. Charles Wiener, “A new site for the seminar. The refugees and American physics 
in the thirties,” in Donald Fleming, ed., The intellectual migration. Europe and America, 
1930-1960 (London, 1969), 190-228, on 190. 
3. Jeff Hughes, “Engineering the atom: Dogma, dissent and Dr. Tutin” (unpublished) shows 
the existence of competing atomic models in 1930s Britain and relates these to different 
industrial interests and practices; Brian Cathcart, in The ﬂy in the cathedral. How a small 
group of Cambridge scientists won the race to split the atom (London, 2004), discusses the 
“race” between Cambridge scientists and their American rivals in “splitting the atom” by 
high-tension devices.  
4. See J.L. Heilbron and Robert W. Seidel, Lawrence and his laboratory. A history of the 
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory. Vol. I (Berkeley, 1989); Thomas Lassman, “Industrial 
research transformed: Edward Condon at the Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing 
Company, 1935-1942,” Technology and culture, 44:2 (2003), 306-339. 
5. Geoffrey Bowker, “Whatʼs in a patent,” in Wiebe E. Bijker and John Law, eds., Shaping 
technology/building society. Studies in socio-technological change (Cambridge, 1992), 53-
74; H. Etzkowitz and A. Webster, “Science as intellectual property,” in J. Peter, G. Markle, 
S. Jasanoff, and T. Pinch, eds., Handbook of science, technology, and society (Beverly Hills, 
1994), 480-505.
6. Peter Galison, Einstein sʼ clocks, Poincaré maps (London, 2003), and Image and logic 
(Chicago, 1997), 803-844.
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of Enrico Fermi and his nuclear physics group in Rome chieﬂy from a consider-
ation of patents and industrial applications. Historians have discussed in detail 
the signiﬁcance of Fermiʼs research for nuclear physics, but not the signiﬁcance 
of consequent business relations.7 In the 1930s the discovery of a method to slow 
down neutrons coincided with Fermiʼs attempt to exploit the method industrially. 
The method seemed to have promise for the production of artiﬁcial radioactive 
elements useful in medical diagnosis and treatment. A market already existed for 
natural ones. Artiﬁcial isotopes promised to be cheaper and more varied. And the 
nuclear reactions involved suggested the possibility of useful power generation. 
After 1934 one of Fermiʼs priorities was ensuring the ﬁling of patents to protect the 
intellectual property of his group in the industrial development of his method.
Fermiʼs “trading activities,” his attempts to partner with industrialists and 
promote the adoption of the patented methods, were informed by a national agenda. 
His group worked in a totalitarian regime that sought to increase the number of 
patented inventions made in Italy, and made a place for this political goal within 
its research on nuclear reactions. Many within the Italian scientiﬁc community 
and the regime were concerned about the low number of patents ﬁled in Italy or 
by Italians in foreign countries. The imbalance forced Italian industrialists to buy 
innovation abroad rather than exploit the national R&D system. Scientiﬁc leaders 
in Italy during the 1930s stressed the need to upgrade scientiﬁc research that could 
bring about technological change and innovation.8 
Fermiʼs patron, Orso Maria Corbino, made the group aware of the importance 
of ﬁling patents as well as publishing scientiﬁc papers. Fearing the possibility of 
interference in patent matters, the group became more reticent about communicating 
research ﬁndings after the discovery of the efﬁcacy of slow neutrons. The industrial 
and patent agents who dealt with Fermi and his group pressured them against com-
municating research results to colleagues abroad without previous consultation.
By patenting the slow neutron process and promoting its sale to several Ameri-
can and European ﬁrms, Fermi and his group sought to proﬁt from it. Jeff Hughes 
has highlighted that research communities working in nuclear physics during the 
1930s could rely upon a network of “invisible industrialists” who provided tools for 
research in return for novelties that could be used industrially.9 The case of Fermi 
7. Some aspects relating to patenting and trading are discussed in Emilio Segrè, Enrico Fermi. 
Physicist (Chicago, 1970), 83-85; Edoardo Amaldi, “From the discovery of the neutron to 
the discovery of nuclear ﬁssion,” Physics reports, 111 (1984), 5-331, on 154-160; Laura 
Fermi, Atoms in the family. My life with Enrico Fermi (Chicago, 1954).
8. Helge Kragh has observed “whether he liked it or not, Fermi was part of Italian politics 
and his research group in Rome, in reality, was protected by the fascist state.” Helge Kragh, 
Quantum generations. A history of physics in the twentieth century (Princeton, 1999), 239. 
But I believe that itʼs more appropriate to understand the relationship between Fermiʼs group 
and the Facist regime in terms of convergence on a speciﬁc aspect of science policy. 
9. Jeff Hughes, “Plasticine and valves: Industry, instrumentation and the emergence of nuclear 
physics,” in J.P. Gaudillere and Ilona Lowy, eds., The invisible industrialist: Manufacturers 
and the construction of scientiﬁc knowledge (London, 1998), 58-101. 
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and his group not only conﬁrms this argument, but also shows that the “invisible 
businessman” ﬁgured importantly in the emergence of nuclear physics in Italy. 
Previously unexamined archival documents show that to exploit the slow-neutron 
process Fermi worked with Gabriello Giannini, a young Italian émigré in America. 
Acting as consultant to the group, he sought to bolster his position as a businessman 
and his contacts with the representatives of industrial companies. 
The commercial expectations of Fermiʼs group soon led it into competition 
with other foreign researchers who looked toward similar applications. Fermi and 
Giannini considered partnerships with some competitors in order to strengthen their 
position against others. These negotiations opened the possibility of forming new 
companies to which Fermiʼs and others  ʼpatents would be assigned. These attempts 
to join forces and shape alliances were not successful. By 1939 business seemed 
bleak and Giannini sought a quick sale of the European patents. 
Even so, the interplay between Fermi, Giannini, and the companies involved 
in the slow neutron “business” deserves historical consideration. Not only does it 
reveal new motives for the development of nuclear physics in Italy in the prewar 
years, it also shows that at an international level, competition and trading activities 
informed the relationships established by the nuclear physicists among themselves 
and with the industrial world.
1. PATENTS, INNOVATION, AND SCIENCE POLICY IN FASCIST ITALY
At the beginning of the 20th century, Italy was a mix of different people and 
languages: a hodgepodge of cultures and technological systems without nation-
ally structured railways or electrical networks. Shortly before World War I, Italian 
governments shaped a new progressivist faith in science and technology, considered 
as stimuli to the development of industrial manufacturing. In 1923, the establish-
ment of an Italian national research council (Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, 
CNR) responded to the urgency to develop a system of new national laboratories 
and schools of specialization to link academic and industrial research.10 When 
the Fascist party rose to power in 1922, it was unable to outline a clear industrial, 
economic, and scientiﬁc policy.11 The international economic crisis of 1929 focused 
its attention; scientiﬁc and technological innovation would be a tool to overcome 
the state of economic depression by the introduction of new methods of industrial 
production. A year after the crisis, the expenditure of the Italian government on 
10. See Luigi Tomassini, “Le origini,” and Raffaella Simili, “La Presidenza Marconi,” in 
Raffaella Simili and Giovanni Paoloni, eds., Per una storia del Consiglio Nazionale delle 
Ricerche, 5-127.
11. Between 1922 and 1929 Italy enjoyed a moderate industrial expansion largely fuelled by 
lack of state intervention. The 1929 world economic crisis enhanced state intervention. In 
1935 the beginning of economic autarky made the state a central actor in national economy. 
Gianni Toniolo, Lʼeconomia dellʼItalia Fascista (Bari, 1980); William G. Welk, Fascist 
economic policy (Cambridge, 1938), 159.   
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scientiﬁc research grew markedly.12 In the late 1920s the two major centers for 
investigations in radioactivity and cosmic rays were established at the Institute of 
Physics in Rome and Florence University. 
In 1927, after a few years of political turmoil and lack of direction, the CNR 
operated as an organization directly controlled by the chief of government, Benito 
Mussolini. Guglielmo Marconi became its director. Fascist propaganda portrayed 
him as a symbol of “Italian genius.” But many within the Italian scientiﬁc com-
munity understood that he personiﬁed a pragmatic and successful approach to 
scientiﬁc research, which consisted in securing proﬁts by patenting novelties rather 
than committing to academic research and publishing.13 Marconi had patented his 
apparatus to transmit and detect electromagnetic waves and formed a successful 
business, the Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company, to exploit it.14 
Italians regarded Marconiʼs achievements as consequences of an enlightened 
patenting practice that provided a better protection of intellectual rights than one 
could obtain in Italy.15 The problem was an important one for fascist economic 
policy. Since the late 19th century, Italian inventors had ﬁled far fewer patents 
annually than those in other industrialized countries. The number of Italian pat-
ent applications grew signiﬁcantly from 1883 to 1913, but fell sharply between 
1913 and 1929.16 The output of Italian patents continued below that of Britain, 
France, Germany, Switzerland, and Holland. Moreover, Italian companies relied 
on foreign patents (especially German ones) in industrial processes since Italians 
ﬁled so few.17 One of Marconiʼs main objectives was to direct the Italian scientiﬁc 
community towards patentable research of industrial signiﬁcance. New legislation 
on patents was enacted. The CNR was responsible for outlining new standards of 
patent examination.18
12. Lucia Orlando, “Physics in the 1930s: Jewish physicists  ʼcontribution to the realization 
of the ʻnew tasks  ʼof physics in Italy,” HSPS, 29:1 (1998), 141-181.
13. Segrè: “Marconi was interested in patent applications, not scientiﬁc papers, and for this 
reason he was rather secretive about his procedures, a habit that has presented additional 
difﬁculties for anyone trying to reconstruct his way of methodology.” Emilio Segrè, “Pref-
ace,” in Giancarlo Masini, Marconi (New York, 1995 [1975]), 10.
14. Anna Guagnini, “Patent agents, legal advisers and Guglielmo Marconiʼs breakthrough 
in wireless telegraphy,” History of technology, 24 (2002), 171-201.
15. The Italian mechanical engineer Antonio Meucci invented the ﬁrst telephone (the “tele-
trofono”); the patent was assigned to Alexander Graham Bell. See Basilio Catania, “The U.S. 
government versus Alexander Graham Bell: An important acknowledgement for Antonio 
Meucci,” Bulletin of science, technology and society, 22 (2002). 426-442. 
16. Renato Giannetti, Tecnologia e sviluppo economico italiano,1870-1990 (Bologna, 
1998), 47-51. 
17. During the late 19th century only 39 percent of Italian patents were ﬁled by Italian 
inventors. LʼItalie économique en 1867 (Florence, 1867), 63. 
18. Marconi wrote in 1932: “The fascist government has taken a notable step forward in 
the training and encouragement of promising inventors. The new legislation on intellectual 
ownership constitutes considerable progress in this direction, but above all it is with the 
standardization of examination for patents, now realized through the initiative of the CNR, 
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Between 1922 and 1929 industrial production in Italy grew by about 75%, a 
rate that equaled France (78%) and far surpassed the U.S. (40%), Britain (21.5%), 
and Germany (24.5%). Exports almost doubled (up by 73.63%), led by automo-
biles and chemicals. However, these industries relied heavily on the importation 
of raw materials, which also grew markedly. Consequently, the regime sought 
new ways to produce chemicals, fuels, and other substitutes for raw materials. 
Marconi was made chairman of a government committee, Scarce Raw Materials 
and Substitutes.19 Securing these substitutes through Italian rather than foreign 
patents became state policy. 
In the early 1930s, fascist science policy was embedded within the context of 
the corporate state of which the CNR, as promoter of Italian scientiﬁc and techno-
logical innovation, was an essential ingredient.20 Marconi and Nicola Parravano, 
a university professor and chairman of the CNRʼs committee for chemistry, were 
now keen to sustain collaboration between individual research groups and Italian 
companies in some leading sectors such as chemistry and metallurgy.21 The col-
laboration also fostered production of ersatz materials centered on new types of 
fuels such as alcohols, vegetable oils, and gases.22 The situation for power genera-
tion and transmission was similar. Giuseppe Volpi di Misurata was chairman of the 
Società Adriatica di Elettricità (one of the largest Italian electrical ﬁrms) as well 
as the Minister of Finance between 1925 and 1929. He stressed that the transmis-
sion of electric power over long distances depended on “pioneers in the science of 
electricity and its practical application.”23 
that the problem has been reduced to practical terms,” Il Popolo dʼItalia, 28 Oct 1932 
(quoted in Masini, ref. 13, 327).
19. Anton Stefano Benni, “The industrial growth of fascist Italy,” in Tommaso Silani, ed., 
What is fascism and why? (London, 1931), 281-289. Coal, coke, mineral oil, and derivatives 
could represent up to 20.6% of the total imports of Italy. Rolf Petri, “Technical change in the 
Italian chemical industry: Markets, ﬁrms and state intervention,” in A.S. Trevis et al., eds., 
Determinants in the evolution of the European chemical industry, 1900-1939 (Dordrecht, 
1998), 280, 286. 
20. “The state, the corporazioni national organizations bringing together companies, industri-
alists, technocrats and workers  ʼrepresentatives, and the economy as a whole, in the face of the 
inherent uncertainty of economic development, had to behave like an individual entrepreneur 
gambling on the long-term beneﬁts of [technological innovation].” Petri (ref. 19), 285-286. 
See also Vera Zamagni, The economic history of Italy (Oxford, 1993), 242-317. 
21. Renato Giannetti, “Il CNR e le politiche per la ricerca e lʼinnovazione industriale,” in 
Simili and Paoloni (ref. 10), 224-239.
22. Luigi Casaleʼs patents on a catalytic process to produce methanol underwrote a new 
plant in the city of Terni thanks to the Società Italiana Ricerche Industriali (SIRI), a leading 
agency specialized in chemical R&D. In 1928, Giulio Natta, a chemical engineer at Turin 
University, supervised the production of methanol in new plants built by Montecatini. In 
1931, a new chemistry committee of the CNR stressed the priority of research on alcohols 
as fuels. Luigi Cerruti, “La chimica,” in Simili and Paoloni (ref. 10), 406-447.
23. Giuseppe Volpi di Misurata, “Hydro-electric development in Italy,” in Silani (ref. 19), 
290-298.
 NUCLEAR PHYSICS IN ITALY 159
Fermiʼs patron, Corbino, was a staunch supporter of the fascist new economic 
deal and one of Marconiʼs allies. A physicist interested in the commercial appli-
cations of electricity, he had ﬁled a few patents on high-tension equipment, but 
since 1927 had effectively given up active research to pursue a career as scientiﬁc 
manager and politician.24 Corbino was on the board of directors of many Italian 
companies including Italian General Electric and the Edison Company of Milan. 
He was active in the Italian Bureau of Standards and the national patent ofﬁce, and, 
withall, was a Senator, Minister of Public Education, and Minister of Economics 
and Industry.25
Corbino had more than enough clout to establish a chair for Fermi. In 1926, 
following study at the Universities of Pisa (1918-1922) and Göttingen, he returned 
to Rome to take up his professorship.26 Fermi soon established a group of keen 
students interested in theoretical as well as applied research. Helped by his former 
fellow student in Pisa, Franco Rasetti, Fermi attracted students from the faculty of 
engineering, who were fascinated by Fermiʼs lectures and appreciated the potential 
of physics for practical applications. These included sons of entrepreneurs such as 
Emilio Segrè (the son of a general manager in hydroelectric power and papermak-
ing companies) and Bruno Pontecorvo (the son of a textile manufacturer).27 The 
fathers of other group members such as Ettore Majorana, Edoardo Amaldi, and 
Giovanni Gentile were distinguished academics. Fermiʼs group reﬂected a social 
network uniting various strands of the new middle class, particularly industrial 
managers and university professors. 
Corbino helped Fermi to gain positions of responsibility within industrial and 
research establishments. In 1927, Fermi was made chairman of the CNR physics 
committee.28 In March 1929, a report of the political police indicated that Volpi 
di Misurata, the most inﬂuential businessman in Italy, had sponsored Fermiʼs ap-
pointment as a member of the newly established Accademia dʼItalia and that Fermi 
was developing “a formula for a new type of fuel” for Volpiʼs company.29 Fermi 
24. O.M. Corbino, “Transformation of polyphase current into practically constant current,” 
U.S. 1390504, issued 13 Oct 1921; and O.M. Corbino [with Giulio Cesare Trabacchi], 
“Improvements in or relating to apparatus for obtaining high-tension one direction current 
from three-phase currents,” GB 129,092, issued 30 June 1919. 
25. Franco Rasetti, interview with John Kennedy, 1966, Fermi documentary ﬁlm collec-
tion, Harvard Project Physics, box 1, Background research materials and interviews, NBL; 
Eduardo Amaldi, “Personal notes on neutron work in Rome,” in Wiener (ref. 2), 317.
26. Francesco Cordella, Alberto De Gregorio, and Fabio Sebastiani, Enrico Fermi. Gli anni 
italiani, (Rome, 2001), chapts. 3-5.
27. Pontecorvo joined the group only in 1933. Miriam Mafai, Il lungo freddo. Storia di 
Bruno Pontecorvo, lo scienziato che scelse lʼURSS (Milan, 1992), 43; Emilio Segrè, A mind 
always in motion (Berkeley, 1993), 9.
28. Giovanni Battimeli and Michelangelo De Maria, “La ﬁsica,” in Simili and Paoloni (ref. 
10), 285.
29. Sergio Romano, Giuseppe Volpi. Industria e ﬁnanza tra Giolitti e Mussolini (Rome, 
1997), 214.
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became a member of the board at the National Broadcasting Company (the Ente 
Italiano Audizioni Radiofoniche) as well as director of research laboratories at the 
electro-technical ﬁrm Magneti Marelli. With a strong research group, a solid aca-
demic position, several consultancies in large Italian ﬁrms, and Corbinoʼs political 
backing, Fermi was well placed to develop nuclear physics. 
In the mid-1930s, Italian reformers and science policy-makers had to acknowl-
edge a signiﬁcant setback in their program, as they could not maintain sufﬁcient 
research funding to have an impact on the number of patents ﬁled by Italian inven-
tors. In 1935, Giulio Provenzal, editor of the CNR journal La ricerca scientiﬁca, 
lamented the poor national output of patents. Only 33 percent of 10,000 patents 
ﬁled in Italy were taken out by Italian inventors: multinationals accounted for the 
rest. Provenzal urged the ﬁling of Italian patents abroad and in 1935 an Associazi-
one Nazionale Fascista degli Inventori (National Fascist Association of Inventors) 
sponsored by the CNR committee on inventions, came into existence.30  But in that 
year sanctions brought by the League of Nations after Italyʼs colonial adventure 
in Ethiopia shook the national economy by depriving it of an international market 
and essential imported resources.31  
Marconi had repeatedly but vainly asked Mussolini for more funding for 
research to accomplish the autarchic plan. When Marconi suddenly died of a 
chest infection in 1937, fascist science policy was already failing.32 In addition to 
economic limitations, the lack of intellectual freedom in Italy hampered scientiﬁc 
research. Well before the promulgation of the racial laws that in 1939 deprived 
Italian Jewish academics of their occupations, strict governmental control over 
political, cultural, and social life held back intellectual activities. Political confor-
mity, rather than technical ability and intellectual capacity, became the dominant 
factor in the selection of new scientists and engineers.33 
The trajectory of Fermiʼs group followed the rise and fall of fascist science 
policy. In its growth phase, the group became aware of possible industrial appli-
cations deriving from its research. They considered the signiﬁcance of patenting 
their work and linking it to the world of ﬁnance and industry as the fascist regime 
desired. However, the lack of economic support from the regime combined with 
the increasing lack of intellectual freedom made it impossible for them to continue 
these activities and ultimately led to the groupʼs collapse.  
2. THE NEUTRON PATENT AND THE INVISIBLE BUSINESSMAN
When Fermiʼs group entered nuclear physics, its chief preoccupation was 
the cost of radium. In the early months of 1934, Rasetti salvaged depleted natural 
30. Giulio Provenzal, “La prima mostra nazionale delle invenzioni,” LRS, 6:2 (1935), 91-
106. 
31. Denis Mack Smith, Mussolini (London, 1993), 196-203.
32. Arturo Russo, “Science and industry in Italy between the two world wars,” HSPS, 16:2 
(1986), 281-320, on 293. 
33. Welk (ref. 11), 246-247.
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radioactive sources at Rome University sʼ department of physics for re-use in experi-
ments.34 Research took off when Majorana suggested using neutrons as projectiles 
in nuclear reactions.35 Together with Amaldi, Segrè, and the radio-chemist Oscar 
DʼAgostino (who had just returned to Italy from Paris, where he gained research 
experience with the French physicist Frédéric Joliot-Curie), Fermi bombarded 
fourteen elements with a neutron source of beryllium and radon and obtained im-
portant new radio-activities.36 They published the results in LRS and Nature, thereby 
attracting the interest of other competing groups in Europe. Seeking publicity and 
recognition, Segrè and Amaldi brought Rutherford a comprehensive account of the 
groupʼs experiments. At Rutherfordʼs suggestion, the account was published by 
the Royal Society.37 That summer, Amaldi and Pontecorvo observed that similar 
nuclear reactions seemed to have greater efﬁciency if the apparatus was placed on 
a wooden desk rather than on a marble one.38 The following autumn, Fermi made 
some experiments with blocks of parafﬁn and came to understood that substances 
rich in hydrogen or other light elements could slow down neutrons and increase 
their efﬁciency in nuclear transformations. 
This time Fermi was more circumspect about publishing research results that 
might have commercial value. He sent no communication to Nature or to Rutherford 
for the Royal Society. Ricerca scientiﬁca published an incomplete account sent 
on October 22, 1934. Until then the group had been very eager to publish. Their 
new reluctance followed Corbinoʼs directives. The old physicist and policy-maker 
insisted that the group ﬁle a patent application before publishing further.39
Four days after sending the letter to LRS, Fermi posted a patent application to 
the engineer Letterio Laboccetta.40 The Italian privativa went to the Italian Minis-
try of Industry with the names of Fermi and six other inventors—Rasetti, Segrè, 
Pontecorvo, Amaldi, DʼAgostino, and Giulio Cesare Trabacchi (the director of the 
34. Rasetti obtained a strong source of radium D from radium salts abandoned 14 years 
earlier. Franco Rasetti, “Sopra un forte preparato di Radio D ottenuto nellʼIstituto Fisico di 
Roma,” LRS, 5 (1934), 3-5.
35. See B. Kröger, “On the history of the neutron,” Physis, 22 (1980), 175-190. 
36. Fermi, “Radioactivity induced by neutron bombardment,” Nature, 133 (1934), 757.
37. Fermi, Amaldi, DʼAgostino, Rasetti, and Segrè, “Artiﬁcial radioactivity produced by 
neutron bombardment,” PRS, 146 (1934), 483-500; Segrè (ref. 7), 77.
38. Gerald Holton, “The miracle of the two tables. Enrico Fermi, a piece of parrafﬁn and the 
way towards nuclear ﬁssion,” Times literary supplement (11 Jan 2002), 12-13, on 12.
39. Laura Fermi (ref. 7), 101; Amaldi (ref. 7), 317; Mario George Salvadori, “The Italian 
navigator,” unpub. msc., 1986, p. 33, NBL. Fermiʼs wife, Laura, claimed years later that: 
“One morning....Corbino came into the laboratory....They were preparing to write a more 
extensive report on their experiments..., Corbino became incensed. “What? Do you want to 
publish more than you have already?....Are you crazy? Canʼt you see that your discovery 
may have industrial applications? You should take a patent before you give out more details 
on how to make an artiﬁcial radioactive substances!”
40. Laboccetta to Fermi, 26 Oct 1934, BN. Labboccetta was an engineer expert in measure-
ment standards. 
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medical institute that had provided the neutron source for the experiments).41 Shortly 
afterwards, a letter patent in English was drafted for transmission to the British 
patent ofﬁce. The draft claimed intellectual property with respect to instruments 
and processes for producing radioactive substances by placing a neutron source 
and a target with a moderating material such as parafﬁn, another hydrogenated 
substance, or any substance “of atomic weight less than 14.”42 The patent also 
claimed rights in any artiﬁcially produced radioisotope resulting from the slow 
neutron process.43 By protecting the process (bombardment by low energy neu-
trons), the apparatus (neutron tubes deployed in a medium rich in hydrogen), and 
the products (the artiﬁcial radioisotopes), the Italian inventors made their claims 
extremely (indeed, excessively) wide.
Between October 1934 and June 1935, the groupʼs publications relating to 
the slow-neutron process appeared only in the Italian science journals LRS and Il 
nuovo cimento, which in fact became the main sources of information about their 
experiments for foreign investigators. Only in February 1935 (six months after the 
patent was ﬁled) did they send a complete account of the slow neutron process to 
Rutherford for the PRS.44 Did the resistance to publish research results in journals 
with a wide, international audience reﬂect a deliberate attempt of Corbino or Fermi 
to protect the “invention”? We have no deﬁnitive evidence proving that there was 
a shift in the groupʼs communication strategy. But the fact that this resistance to 
publish coincided with the beginning of international trading activities centered 
on the neutron patent makes the conjecture suggestive.
Gabriello M. Giannini, a former student of Fermi sʼ who had set up as a business-
man in New York, hosted Fermi in the summer of 1935 when Fermi participated 
in a summer school at the University of Michigan. Segrè, Amaldi, and Rasetti also 
spent time in New York as Gianniniʼs guests. Giannini was the son of Torquato C. 
41. The Italian Ministry of Industryʼs inventory of Italian patents shows that the taxes for 
the Italian privativa n. 324.458 ﬁled by Labboccetta on Fermiʼs behalf were paid for the 
period 1934-1938. Carte del Ministero dellʼIndustria, ACS. 
42.  Amaldi, DʼAgostino, Fermi, Pontecorvo, Rasetti, and Segrè, “Method for increasing the 
efﬁciency of nuclear reactions and products thereof,” GB 465,045, Convention date (Italy), 
26 Oct 1934; Application date, 25 Oct 1935; issued, 26 Apr 1937. The patent did not list 
radioisotopes produced or chemical reactions involved, although claim n. 7 claims on any 
radioisotope produced through the method. 
43. The radioisotopes produced by neutron bombardment were “chemically different” from 
those used as sources. For example iron allows producing a radioisotope of manganese, 
while chlorine allows the synthesis of radioactive phosphorus. E. Fermi, “Trasmutazione 
degli elementi,” Sapere, 31 Jan 1935.  
44. Amaldi, DʼAgostino, Fermi, Pontecorvo, Rasetti, Segrè, “Artiﬁcial radioactivity pro-
duced by neutron bombardment. II,” PRS, 149 (1935), 522-558. It is signiﬁcant that most 
of the researchers abroad interested in  reproducing the phenomena during this period had 
to rely on Fermi, Amaldi, Pontecorvo, Rasetti, and Segrè, “Azione di sostanze idrogenate 
sulla radioattività provocata da neutroni,” LRS, 5 (1934), 282-283. This was the case for 
a group of physicists working at St. Bartholomew Hospital (A. Brasch et al., “Liberation 
of neutrons from beryllium by x-rays: Radioactivity induced by means of electron tubes,” 
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Nature, 134 (1934), 494) and for James Chadwick and Maurice Goldhaber (Chadwick and 
Goldhaber, “Disintegration of slow neutrons,” Nature, 134 (1934), 495).
45. G. Prezzolini, “Il Brevetto delle scoperte atomiche italiane comprato dagli SU per 
trecentomila dollari,” 1 Aug 1950, Il Corriere della sera,copy in “Giannini,” Scatola 2, 
Fascicolo 2, CNA. 
46. Fermi, Amaldi, Pontecorvo, Rasetti, and Segrè, “Process for the production of radioac-
tive substances,” U.S. patent n. 2,206,634, 2 Jul 1940, p. 1.
47. Fermi, “Recenti risultati della radioattività artiﬁciale,” LRS, 6 (1935), 399-402. Two years 
later, Segrè, in collaboration with physiologists at the University of Palermo, was able to 
test the efﬁciency of radioactive phosphorus as tracer for studying metabolic disturbances. 
Emilio Segrè to CNR, 18 Jul 1937, Fondo CNR, Versamento I, Busta 155, ACS.
48. C.G. Tubbs to Luigi Raineri, early 1935. I am most grateful to Peter Morris, curator 
at the London Science Museum for providing me with this information, which is now the 
State Archive of Chile. 
49. Leo Szilard, “Memoradum of possible industrial applications arising on a new branch of 
physics,” 28 June 1934, in Spencer R. Weart and Gertrud W. Szilard, eds., Leo Szilard: His 
version of the facts. Selected recollections and correspondence (Cambridge, 1978), 39.
Giannini, vice-president of the society “Dante Alighieri,” established in 1889 to 
spread Italian language and culture abroad. It had become a promoter of commercial 
relations between Italy and other states.45 Giannini had studied in Rome with Fermi 
and then left Italy, starting a business career in New York. His ofﬁce was located 
at 30 Rockefeller Plaza in the heart of the Manhattan ﬁnancial district. 
Giannini and Fermi identiﬁed medicine as the main ﬁeld of application for 
natural radioisotopes, which had a role in diagnosis (as x-rays emitters) and therapy 
(leukemia and cancer).46 They anticipated that artiﬁcial isotopes would replace 
natural ones for these purposes quickly.47 They also foresaw applications of arti-
ﬁcial radioactive isotopes as tracers in laboratory research in chemistry, biology, 
and metallurgy. So did others. In 1935 C.G. Tubbs, the London manager of the 
Nitrate Corporation of Chile (NCC), a large chemical manufacturer, inquired about 
Fermiʼs method from his agent in Rome, Dr. Luigi Raineri:48
In view of the secondary elements in Chilean Nitrate [radioactive isotopes of 
nitrogen, silicon and phosphorus] it might be of interest if you would make en-
quiries into the ﬁndings of Signor Fermi….If these seem to have any bearing on 
the elements present in Chilean Nitrate we would be glad to have a report from 
you and also to receive two copies of any of the scientiﬁc papers which have been 
published on this subject of [artiﬁcial creation of radio-elements].
Further-fetched was the possibility of liberating atomic energy. In 1934 the 
Hungarian physicist Leo Szilard had stressed that the production of artiﬁcial “ra-
dium” for medical purposes was a sound commercial proposition and foresaw that, 
if the new experimental methods were successful in harnessing this energy, “The 
production of energy and its use for power production would be possible on such a 
large scale and probably with so little cost that a sort of industrial revolution could 
be expected.”49 At the same time Corbino pointed out that nuclear physics should 
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be considered a “super-chemistry” in which “nuclear reactions can be compared 
to combustion in which the combustible is the neutron, the only entity that can 
reach the nucleus against the electrical repulsive forces.”50 Corbino calculated that 
the quantity of energy freed in the transformation process with just 50 grams of 
hydrogen could power Italy for one year.51 
In the summer of 1935, Fermiʼs group had ﬁled patent applications in Italy 
and Britain. The threat of sanctions by the League of Nations created concerns, 
however, as the properties of Italian citizens abroad might possibly be seized by the 
national authorities. Although the U.S. was not a member of the League, Giannini 
feared that the American government would follow the European states in penalizing 
Mussoliniʼs country, its citizens, and their trading activities. He thus established a 
new American company that would receive the assignment of rights for Fermiʼs 
application. On October 3, 1935 G.M. Giannini & Company Incorporated ﬁled 
application number 43,462, describing the process to slow down neutrons in the 
U.S. patent ofﬁce.52 
Giannini tried to persuade General Electric and Westinghouse to develop 
artiﬁcial radioactivity either by licensing or buying Fermiʼs process. According to 
Giannini, Westinghouse was willing to acquire the license for about $ 25,000.53 In 
July 1935 Harvey Rentschler, the director of research at the Westinghouse Lamp 
Division of Bloomﬁeld (New Jersey), recommended the acquisition of Fermiʼs 
patent and set aside funding to start research on the neutron process. Negotiations 
continued throughout the following year, but by the summer of 1936 Rentschler 
had decided that Fermi sʼ method could be contested. He complained that Giannini sʼ 
patent application was incomplete, while his agreement with the inventors would not 
protect Westinghouse in the case of litigation between them and the assignor.54 
The breakthrough for Fermiʼs and Gianniniʼs neutron business came when 
Segrè contacted Cornelius Bakker, whom he had known since his study trip to 
Amsterdam in 1931.55 Bakker worked for the Dutch ﬁrm Philips Gloeilampenfab-
riken. The company immediately showed an interest in Fermiʼs method probably 
because it already had a well-developed research laboratory producing x-ray vacuum 
tubes such as the newly designed Metalix. These tubes were already employed in 
radiology and in the treatment of illnesses such as skin carcinoma.56 The Philips 
50. O.M. Corbino, “Prospettive e risultati della ﬁsica moderna,” LRS, 5 (1934), 615-620, 
on 618.
51. Ibid., 617.
52. Giannini to Fermi, 11 Nov 1935, BN.
53. Giannini to Fermi, 25 Nov 1935, BN.
54. Giannini to Fermi, 11 Oct 1935, BN; Lassman (ref. 4), 315-317.  
55. Segrè (ref. 27), 66.
56. Philips to Segrè, 20 Sep 1935, and H. Hijmans, Chef des Services des brèvets dʼinvention 
des usines, Philips to Fermi, 20 Sep 1935, BN; Kees Boersma, “Tensions within an industrial 
research laboratory: The Philips laboratory sʼ x-ray department between the wars,” Enterprise 
and society, 4 (2003), 65-98, on 77.
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managers perceived that a license on Fermi sʼ process would entitle them to produce 
tubes using slowed neutrons.57 In October 1935, Giannini agreed with E. Hijmans, 
the companyʼs patent manager, that Philips would take over the administration 
of European patents. In exchange, Giannini and the inventors would receive ﬁve 
percent of the royalties until 1938.58 On  October 14, 1935 Hijmans visited Rome 
and was impressed by the simple and effective method designed by the group, as 
well as hopeful about its industrial application.59 A few days earlier, Hijmans had 
approached the pharmaceutical company Sharpe & Dome.60 The contract with 
Philips was the most signiﬁcant success obtained by Fermi and his associates. It 
convinced them that further research developments in the ﬁeld would allow them 
to proﬁt from their patented method.
While ﬁnalizing these agreements, Fermi was again made aware of the impor-
tance of controlling the publication of ﬁndings. Philips provided guidelines requiring 
that research ﬁndings be communicated “promptly” to the company, and that “in 
no case should publications of any sort be made before a patent was ﬁled.”61 The 
international competition on radioisotopes production had intensiﬁed. 
3. FERMIʼS COMPETITORS AND THE RESEARCH CORPORATION(S)
Fermi was not the only one who had forseeen the economic potential of nuclear 
physics. Other physicists in Europe and the U.S. had devoted time and energy to 
similar activities applying for patents on transmutation processes, instruments, and 
products. It was thus inevitable that the beginning of Fermi and Gianniniʼs trading 
activities ensued ﬁerce competition as well as attempted to shape new business al-
liances. On January 2, 1936 Giannini ﬁled a second patent in the U.S. and Canada. 
It incorporated research Fermi had conducted since 1934 on sixty elements that 
when bombarded with slow neutrons, emitted β-rays after neutron absorption. The 
patent, “Composition of matter and method of producing the same” indicated the 
wide-ranging goals of Fermi sʼ program, which now aimed to “make available a large 
group of new chemical substances, isotopes of the natural elements.”62 Among the 
elements considered in the patent was number “93,” which had been the subject of 
57. A neutron-generating tube, designed by Frans Michael Penning, was assigned to Philips. 
Frans M. Penning, “Electronic device,” U.S. patent n. 2,211,668, ﬁled 7 Jan 1938, issued 
13 Aug 1940.
58. Giannini to Hijmans, 18 Nov 1935, BN. Hijmans was a patent expert employed by Philips 
in 1921 in connection with the transfer of Dutch rights to General Electricʼs patents relating 
to the manufacture of icandescent lamps and glass, and the establishment of a new patent 
department in Eindhoven. A. Heerding, The history of N.V. Philips  ʼGloeilampenfabriken 
(2 vols., Cambridge, 1986), 2, 333.
59. Hijmans to Fermi, 16 Oct 1935, BN.
60. Hijmans to Fermi, 10 Oct 1935, BN.
61. Sannes to Fermi, Mar 1936, BN.
62. The patent was never issued in the U.S.  Enrico Fermi, “Radio-active isotope produc-
tion,” is Canadian patent CA 407559, issued 22 Oct 1942. 
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media interest since Fermi had started research on β-emitting isotopes in 1934.63 
Slow neutron bombardment of uranium followed by β-decay had led to the creation 
of some “trans-uranic” elements.64 
In the meantime the director of the Radiation Laboratory at Berkeley, Ernest 
Orlando Lawrence, labeled “ridiculous” Fermiʼs attempt to patent all neutron ac-
tivations, and not only those strictly deriving from slow neutron bombardment.65 
Throughout the 1930s, Lawrence had tried to achieve the same goals as the Italians. 
From 1932 he had used a new high-tension machine, the cyclotron, to bombard 
various elements with deuterons and he had obtained many new radio activities.66 
He had focused on the production of radio-sodium (Na-24) from normal table salt 
and was hopeful that the radioisotope could soon replace natural radium in the 
treatment of cancer.67 In 1935 Rasetti visited Berkeley to conﬁrm the productivity 
of the cyclotron. He discovered that the machine could generate 10 billion neu-
trons per second, a quantity far surpassing what Fermiʼs group could obtain with 
neutron tubes. Lawrenceʼs daily output of radiosodium emitted a quantity of γ-rays 
equivalent to 100 mg of radium.68 In 1937, Lawrence considered the prospects 
of radio-phosphorus (P-32) and radio-iron (Fe-59), which could be used to treat 
leukemia. Treatments of this kind generated a market ranging between $200,000 
and $500,000 each year in the U.S. alone.69 Soon Fermi became aware that if he 
wanted his patents to be successful in the American and European markets, his 
method would have to offer more than Lawrenceʼs.  
Lawrence was not Fermiʼs only rival. Szilard had patented similar methods. 
By 1934, he had become obsessed with a “chain reaction” that he tried to patent.70 
The patented method consisted of three parts: generation of neutrons to provoke 
reactions; separation of radioisotopes produced by the neutron process; and utiliza-
tion of the heat liberated in the transmutation for energy purposes.71 Szilard sʼ patent 
63. “New heavy element created,” The times, 4 June 1934, Nature, 134 (1934), 863. See 
also Fermi, Rasetti, DʼAgostino, “Sulla possibilità di produrre elementi di numero atomico 
maggiore di 92,” LRS, 5 (1934), 533.
64. In accordance with Fascist nationalistic rhetoric, element 93 was named “Esperio” and 94 
“Ausonio the Esperii and Ausonii were two ancient Italian populations. The elemento were 
not transuranic. Battimelli, De Maria, and Paoloni, Lʼistituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare. 
Storia di una comunità di ricerca (Bari, 2001), 15.
65. E.O. Lawrence to H.A. Poillion, 24 Sep 1940, in Heilbron and Seidel (ref. 4), 204.
66. Heilbron and Seidel (ref. 4), chapt. 2; Cathcart (ref. 3), 193-196. 
67.  Ibid., 188.
68. Fermi doubted Lawrenceʼs production in the range of the microcuries when he expected 
millicuries. To convince him, Lawrence sent a millicurie of radiosodium by post. Ibid., 
187.
69. Heilbron and Seidel (ref. 4), 197.
70. William Lanouette, Genius in the shadow. A biography of Leo Szilard, the man behind 
the bomb (Chicago, 1992), 15; Leo Szilard, “Improvements in or relating to the transmuta-
tion of chemical elements,” GB 630,726, ﬁled 28 June 1934.  
71. Heilbron and Seidel (ref. 4), 199-200.
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lacked sufﬁcient experimental details, and found no industrial takers. He obtained 
an interview with the research director of General Electricʼs branch in England, 
Clifford C. Paterson, who refused to take the matter further.72 Using his network 
of acquaintances in Britain, including the Hungarian physical-chemist Michael 
Polanyi at Manchester University, Szilard tried to gather the support of the chemist 
and Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann, but this attempt also was unsuccessful.73
So by mid-1930 at least three discoverers: Fermi, Lawrence, and Szilard, 
together with their associates and business partners, were competing to open new 
international markets by exploiting radio activations. Fermiʼs method worked well 
but his natural sources of neutrons were weak. Szilardʼs method combined the two 
by using high-tension devices to activate a strong neutron source, but was “never 
reduced to art.”74 
These strengths and limitations inﬂuenced their patronage and industrial 
relations. Lawrence could rely on the Research Corporation, which was also 
the assignee of his cyclotron patent. The corporation was established in 1914 by 
chemist Frederick G. Cottrell with a plan to “serve the growing number of men 
in academic positions who evolve useful and patentable inventions.” It reinvested 
the proceeds of its patents in grants to promising professors.75 In the 1930s, the 
Corporation, directed by Howard A. Poillon, tried to achieve a monopoly on ra-
dioisotope production by controlling rights on the cyclotron patent and essential 
features of the Van de Graaff generator.76 Poillon promoted Lawrenceʼs method 
with Westinghouse and American Cynamid, which were by then considering 
manufacturing cyclotrons.77 This no doubt helped cool Westinghouseʼs interest in 
Gianniniʼs commercial propositions. If Poillon succeeded, no competitor would 
have rivaled the Corporation with respect to rights to use high-tension devices to 
produce strong sources of radioisotopes. 
Fermi and Giannini believed that they could defeat Poillon but they needed 
more powerful sources of neutrons. They also considered that the availability of 
these sources depended on the possibility of using particle accelerators. This meant 
also that they had to shape a business alliance with someone (or some company) 
that owned rights to accelerating machines. The Research Corporationʼs control 
on Lawrenceʼs and Van der Graafʼs devices made it impossible for Giannini to ﬁnd 
such a partner in the U.S. Thus, in March 1936, he decided to go to Britain in an 
attempt to build a collaborative industrial network.
72. Lanouette (ref. 70), 138. 
73. Polany to Szilard, 11 Nov 1934, and 28 June 1935, and Weizmann to Polany, 5 Jul 1935, 
in Weart and Szilard (ref. 49), 41-43. According to Amaldi, “All of them [Szilardʼs patents] 
refer to ideas or results of theoretical considerations without experimental well-founded 
grounds.” Amaldi (ref. 3), 159.
74. Heilbron and Seidel (ref. 4), 199; Amaldi (ref. 73).
75. Ibid., 102.
76. Lassman (ref. 4), 314 and Cathcart (ref. 3), 196-200.
77. Heilbron and Seidel (ref. 4), 197.
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Giannini had a plan to obtain a license on the generator designed in 1932 by 
John Cockcroft and Ernest T. Walton at the Cavendish Laboratory. The machineʼs 
rights were owned by the British ﬁrm Metropolitan-Vickers. But when Giannini 
met the companyʼs representative, Thomas E. Allibone, to negotiate rights relat-
ing to the Cockcroft-Walton device, his offer was rejected. Metropolitan-Vickers 
countered with an offer to buy an option on Fermiʼs patent for a three-year period 
for $2,000 a year. Since Giannini had already signed the contract with Phillips, he 
could not accept the offer.78
Informed by Segrè about Szilardʼs patents Giannini also decided to meet the 
Hungarian to purchase the rights to his process.79 But Szilard had another plan. In 
a letter to Fermi he stressed that patents ought not be considered private property; 
“they should be controlled with a view of public policy.” Szilard suggested setting 
up a research corporation based on proﬁts deriving from selling patented methods 
to boost research. He proposed that he and Fermi share responsibility in the new 
research corporation, unite forces, and pool their patents.80
Moreover, when Giannini met Szilard and offered $2,500 for an exclusive 
license for his invention, he realized that Szilard had ﬁled patents based on other 
scientists  ʼdiscoveries.81 That worried him. After the meeting, Giannini wrote Fermi 
that Szilardʼs proposals were unrealistic.82 “[Szilard] only wanted to take parents 
in countries in which the patent procedure was entirely secret, thus preventing 
some Central European governments from knowing of his ideas and using them 
for militaristic purposes against other nations.” In any case, since Philips already 
had ﬁled the German version of Fermiʼs patent, an agreement with Szilard on a 
partnership basis was now unthinkable. The best Giannini could propose was “a 
sort of non-interference agreement with him [Szilard].”83
Giannini left England empty-handed. He had decided that the Italians had 
to go it alone in the artiﬁcial radioisotopes market. No patent pools could be put 
together; the only possibility for the Italians was to perfect existing neutron tubes. 
If they wanted, they could also try to “invent around” existing (and patented) high-
tension devices in order to make better use of their invention. Szilard was a little 
more successful. In 1936, he assigned the European patent on the “chain reaction” 
78. T.E. Allibone, “Metropolitan-Vickers Electrical Company and the Cavendish Laboratory,” 
in John Hendry, ed., Cambridge physics in the thirties (Bristol, 1984), 150-173, on 171.
79. Giannini to Szilard, 8 Mar 1936, BN. Szilard had used a high-voltage impulse gen-
erator different from both the cyclotron and the Van der Graaff accessible to him at High 
Tension Laboratory of the A.E.G. in Germany. Arno Brasch et al., “Liberation of neutrons 
from Beryllium by x-rays: Radioactivity induced by means of electron tubes.” Nature, 134 
(1934), 494.
80. Szilard, Clarendon Laboratory to Fermi, 13 Mar 1936, BN.
81. Amaldi claimed that patent n. U.S. 440023 included methods that “had been developed 
by other people,” in Amaldi (ref. 3), 159; Cockcroft judged that in business matters Szilard 
was a “mildly dangerous character.” Giannini to Fermi, 24 Mar 1936, BN.
82. Giannini to Fermi, 17 Mar 1936, BN.
83. Ibid. 
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to the British Admiralty. The corresponding American patent was assigned to 
Isbert Adam, a Havana importer and a relative of Braschʼs, in return for $15,000 
in research support.84 
4. ECONOMIC FAILURE AND REFUGE
By the late 1930s, it had become painfully clear that the slow neutron process 
promised more than it could actually deliver. Moreover, fascist science policy had 
turned out to be ﬁnancially unsustainable and Femiʼs group had started to dissolve. 
The beginning of 1936 saw only Fermi and Amaldi conducting research at the 
Institute in Rome. Segrè had gone to the University of Palermo, DʼAgostino to the 
CNR, Pontecorvo to France.85  
In 1937 the deaths of Corbino and Marconi deprived Fermi of political and 
ﬁnancial support. At the beginning of that year Fermi produced a new proposal 
for the CNR general meeting making clear that high-tension devices could be 
thousands of times more efﬁcient than the tubes he employed. Either the Fascist 
regime made available funding to build a high-tension device or no industrial ap-
plication of commercial relevance would ensue.86 In June 1938, Fermiʼs proposal 
was rejected and he received less than half the funds he had requested.87 With the 
means available, research on the slow neutrons was at a dead end. 
To add to the difﬁculties, the patents turned out to have a ﬂimsy commercial 
value. By 1936, the crumbling of Fermi sʼ group had made it difﬁcult even to ﬁnalize 
the contract with Philips. The ﬁnal contract included three amendments implying 
the possibility of the disintegration of the group.88 The lack of immediate industrial 
applications complicated matters further. 
Writing to Fermi in April 1939, Giannini stressed that the efﬁciency of the 
Philips neutron tube was “substantially higher than expected,” but still of the order 
of magnitude indicated in the ﬁrst experiments. Although Philips was trying to 
develop a “commercial version of this instrument,” the cyclotron had improved 
84. Heilbron and Seidel (ref. 4), 205.
85. Segrè (ref. 7), 87. 
86. Fermi told Hijmans that Trabacchiʼs institute would build a high-tension device for 
radioisotope production. The institute would allow Fermi access to the machine if Philips 
did not ask for royalties. Fermi to Hymans, 9 Jan 1937, BN.
87. Ivana Gambaro, “Acceleratori di particelle e laboratori per le alte energie: Roma e Parigi 
negli anni Trenta,” Rivista di storia della scienza, 1 (1993), 105-154. Giovanni Battimelli 
and Ivana Gambaro, “Da via Panisperna a Frascati: Gli acceleratori mai realizzati,” Quaderni 
di storia della ﬁsica, 1 (1997), 319-333.
88. Giannini wrote Hijmans that “some of them [the inventors] feel that the inventivity 
[sic] in the future is not likely to remain uniform, particularly if the group disintegrates 
between various laboratories and countries” and that selling their future ﬁndings to Philips 
“may preclose [sic] them the possibility of accepting, eventually, industrial research jobs, 
or professorships with US universities of a particular type.” Giannini to Hijmans, 21 Feb 
1936, BN.
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more rapidly. Philips had been able to sell only three neutron tubes for a price “in 
the neighborhood of $1,000.”89 Although doubtful about future proﬁts deriving from 
the invention, Philips was happy to continue a ﬁve percent licensing agreement for 
the coming years. Fermi responded that Giannini should try to sell the European 
rights in the range of $5,000.90 Giannini sold them to Philips for $3,200.
News from the U.S. fuelled moderate optimism. In 1939, the prospects of 
Giannini and Company, Inc. had improved substantially. Giannini had established 
a partnership with the Philips representative in New York, the consultant engineer 
L.V. Graner, and had brought together executives of Philips and the General Elec-
tric X-Ray Corporation. GE was now considering a purchase of Fermiʼs patents.91 
At the same time, Fermi and his associates continued their struggle with the U.S. 
patent ofﬁce. The examiners had objected to issuing the two patents on the ground 
that several publications had anticipated their claims. The examiners cited papers 
by Fermiʼs competitors and widely known works describing recent discoveries in 
nuclear physics.92 
Apparently the novelty of Fermiʼs invention (the use of low energy neutrons) 
was difﬁcult to grasp.93 The examiners liked a paper by the American physicist 
Karl K. Darrow, who had reviewed recent advances in nuclear physics and men-
tioned the use of neutrons as projectiles.94 The used it to reject the ﬁrst patent for 
the second time, in December 1936. The examiners pointed out that using slow 
neutrons was no invention as “it is customary to use the material to be bombarded 
in a paste form, a petroleum jelly usually being used as the base for forming such 
a paste.”95 Amaldi wrote to Giannini that the objection was an “idiocy exceeding 
even the standards to be usually expected by that ofﬁce.”96 He thought that even 
Darrow would agree, if asked, to provide the patent ofﬁce with a written statement 
89. Giannini to Segrè (copy to Fermi), 18 Apr 1939, “Segrè Emilio,” box 11, folder 13, 
EFP.
90. Giannini to Fermi, 8 Apr 1939, BN. 
91. Giannini to Segrè (ref 89), “Segrè (ref. 89).
92. The papers included Gilbert N. Lewis, M. Stanley Livingston, and E.O. Lawrence, “The 
emission of alpha-particles from various targets bombarded by deutons of high speed,” Physi-
cal review, 44 (1933), 55-56; E.O. Lawrence, M. Stanley Livingston, and G.N. Lewis, “The 
emission of protons from various targets bombarded by deutons of high speed,” Physical 
review, 44 (1933), 56; Frédéric Joliot-Curie and Irène Curie, “Artiﬁcial production of a new 
kind of radio-element,” Nature, 133 (1934), 201-202.
93. One of Fermiʼs attorneys remarked: “It must be admitted that the production of heavy 
isotopes of hydrogen by reaction of a proton and a neutron was known. It was not known, 
however, that low energy neutrons should be used for this reaction. On the contrary it was 
speciﬁcally stated that the neutrons used had energies of several million volts.” Newell to 
Fermi, Giannini, Rasetti and Hijmans, 13 Feb 1936, BN.
94. Karl K. Darrow, “Contemporary advances in physics, XXVII. The nucleus, second part,” 
Bell System technical journal, 13 (1934), 102-157.
95. Newell to Giannini, 15 Dec 1936, BN.
96. Amaldi to Giannini, 15 Jan 1936, BN.
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about the novelty of Fermiʼs invention. Giannini replied that the examiners were 
not “wholly familiar” with the subject.97 
In 1939, the examiners ﬁnally rejected the ﬁrst patent. Fermiʼs U.S. attorney, 
Truman Safford, petitioned the U.S. patent ofﬁce Board of Appeals for a review. 
The petition succeeded, and on July 2, 1940, the slow neutron patent was issued. 
It differed signiﬁcantly from the Italian and British ones in providing detailed ex-
perimental results on all 92 chemical elements. It claimed rights only on the proc-
ess of generating slow neutrons probably to conform with U.S. patent legislation 
that distinguishes between controlling a process and a product. The second patent 
failed; the Board of Appeals rejected it on May 12, 1941.98 The patent on β-emis-
sive elements, however, succeeded with the Canadian patent ofﬁce.99
That is not the end of the story.  The nuclear pile, designed by Fermi in 1942 
became the model for the chief instrument for the production of radio-elements and 
nuclear power after World War II. The principle of slowing neutrons was essential to 
the functioning of piles. This gave Fermi and his ex-associates a possible claim for 
license fees for the slow neutron process. Because of the secrecy of the Manhattan 
Project, however, Fermi had to sell all the patents relative to nuclear piles for one 
dollar each. He and Segrè continued to claim compensation for the use of the slow 
neutron patent. Despite an initial promise of a fee of $900,000, negotiations with 
military ofﬁcers failed. In 1946 Fermi et al. put forward a new claim on the transfer 
of the assets of the Manhattan District to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission 
(USAEC) . Eventually the parties settled, in 1953, for a third of the amount initially 
promised: $300,000.100 Thanks to this agreement, companies associated with the 
USAEC had a free license to produce radioisotopes. As Westinghouse and General 
Electric were among these companies, they can be considered the only winners in 
this history, since they could now sell radioisotopes in a fast-developing market 
without paying fees to the inventors of the processes they used.
97. Giannini to Segrè, 18 Apr 1939, box 13, folder 4, EFP.
98. U.S. Patent Ofﬁce, Board of Appeals, Appeal No. 32,841 (copy in box 19, folder 2, 
EFP). 
99. Enrico Fermi, “Radio-active isotope production,” CA patent n. 407559, issued on 22 
Oct 1942.
100. Simone Turchetti, “For slow neutrons, slow pay” (forthcoming).
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The invisible businessman: Nuclear physics, patenting practices, and trading 
activities in the 1930s
ABSTRACT
In the 1930s the production of patents for the protection of intellectual rights became 
central to the research activities of Enrico Fermi and his group, consistently with a 
research policy emerging within the Italian Fascist Regime. Behind their work was 
an international network consisting of businessmen, industrialists, and multination-
als who helped them patent their method for the production of artiﬁcial radioactive 
elements and to promote its industrial exploitation. The lack of research funding 
combined with a more aggressive foreign policy of the regime made it impossible 
for the group to continue these activities in Rome, and in 1938 the promulgation 
of racial laws forced them to migrate abroad.
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